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Abstract. For several centuries, the dominant worldview in industrial societies has held that various prob-
lems —such as those recently identiﬁed as relating to sustainability— can be solved through technological
progress. Technological progress has been conceived as the fruits of engineering science, new knowledge,
and innovation. While knowledge of the principles of physics is certainly a necessary condition for techno-
logical development, it is not a suﬃcient condition. Technology is not only a product of engineering, but,
ultimately, also of asymmetric transfers of biophysical resources. In other words, the feasibility of techno-
logical progress is contingent on world market prices. The history of technology has been written from the
perspective of advancing ingenuity, rather than that of unequal global exchange. The implicit world view
underlying dominant historiography and economic science ignores the deepening global inequalities which
are prerequisite to what some sectors of world society can celebrate as technological progress, including
visions of replacing fossil fuels with biofuels and other renewable energy sources. This observation should
prompt us to conceptualize technological progress as an inherently unequal capacity to locally save time
and space at the expense of human time and natural space lost elsewhere. It implies that the physical
agency of technology ultimately rests on prices, i.e. subjective human conceptions about the value of mar-
ket commodities, and thus ﬁnally on the magical artifact we know as money. The purpose of this article is
to show how current deliberations on biofuels illustrate the insuﬃciencies of mainstream understandings
of the phenomenon of technology, and to indicate why an adequate understanding of technology must be
interdisciplinary, combining insights on both Nature and Society.
1 Introduction
Since the 1970s I have spent most of my spare time managing a farm on the east coast of Sweden. After having raised
sheep (at most close to 190 ewes) and beef cows to keep its around 40 hectares of ﬁelds and pastures from reverting
to forest, I currently ﬁnd it more economically rational to approach these surfaces as huge lawns to be polished with
a machine resembling a large lawn-mower mounted on my tractor. Each year, vast volumes of grass are simply left
rotting on the ground. I keep reminding myself that these same 40 hectares (and the waters and woods around them)
a century ago provided subsistence for eight large households —around 50 people— on the farm itself, in addition to
producing a continuous ﬂow of foodstuﬀs (mostly dairy products) to the nearest urban centers. I am aware that the
situation is quite similar throughout agriculturally marginal areas of Europe and North America, while millions of
people in Africa and South America are malnourished and in desperate need of agricultural land. It inevitably makes
me wonder about the societal and cultural processes which in some parts of the world have reduced “land” from a
resource crucial to human survival to lawns which we spend our spare time pruning like golf courses. It has also made
me wonder about the proposal, some years back, of planting willow (Salix ) on agricultural land for energy production.
Through what kind of convoluted rationality could there now be serious advocates of encouraging the shrub lands that
our ancestors struggled so hard to keep out of their ﬁelds? What does it tell us about historical changes in European
attitudes to land, and ultimately also about our cornucopian understanding of technology? Could the combustion of
willow bushes really yield enough energy to compensate for the energy expenditures in the production of machines for
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planting, fertilizing, harvesting, transporting, chipping, and burning these shrubs, as well as the consumption of fuels
and fertilizers? What is the role of money and economics in promoting such counter-intuitive schemes for resource
management?
In this article, I will discuss the concept of “biofuels” from an interdisciplinary perspective. I am not a physicist,
but an anthropologist who has struggled for decades to develop interdisciplinary perspectives on the global human
predicament of decreasing sustainability [1–3]. The facts of decreasing sustainability are incontrovertible. To a large
extent, the dilemmas of unsustainability hinge on the technologies of human energy use. In order to grasp our current
sustainability impasse, we need to consider 1) the history of human energy use, 2) the extent to which “technological
progress” in energy use is really a matter of displacing environmental burdens to other populations, and 3) how the
concepts and assumptions that frame our discussions on energy policy reﬂect partial and insuﬃcient understandings
of the global societal exchanges and inequalities on which the feasibility of speciﬁc energy policies rest. Rather than
addressing the technicalities of using biofuels to provide for modern energy needs, a topic that I am not equipped to
deal with, I will thus discuss the historical, political, and cultural contexts of the modern concern with biofuels. I shall
intentionally avoid presenting any ﬁgures to substantiate the points I make, as I know from experience that ﬁgures
can be contested endlessly, but instead conﬁne myself to theoretical arguments.
2 The world-historical context of the notion of “biofuels”
We can begin by observing that the derivation of mechanical energy from biological organisms was ubiquitous prior
to the Industrial Revolution. For thousands of years, the use of wind and water power (and the use of peat by the
Dutch in the early modern period) were marginal complements to the ancient and fundamental dependence on human
labor, draft animals, ﬁrewood, and charcoal, forms of organic energy which all implied harnessing contemporary solar
radiation. Coal had been used for heating in medieval Britain and elsewhere, but with the exception of Dutch peat
the main energy sources in pre-industrial manufacturing processes were renewable. No premodern person would ever
have thought of food, fodder, or charcoal as “biofuels”, although they represent the same principle. While occasional
visionaries like Rudolf Diesel envisaged running diesel engines on vegetable oil from the colonies already a century
ago, the modern concept of “biofuels” was conceived after more than two hundred years of using fossil fuels, as an
alternative energy source that might replace fossil fuels in order to mitigate climate change and substitute for them
as fossil deposits become scarce. Proponents of biofuels generally do not think of them as representing a regression
to pre-industrial times, but both their rationale and the problems they raise revitalize the logistics and dilemmas of
human life prior to the Industrial Revolution.
The turn to fossil fuels and steam technology in the late 18th-century Britain should not simply be understood as a
Promethean breakthrough in engineering, but as 1) propelled by domestic land constraints and 2) contingent on global
economic processes and trade relations. To derive energy from beneath the surface of the earth was a highly successful
option in a landscape characterized by shortages of agricultural land, wood, and reliable watercourses within easy
reach of urban centers. The development of steam technology occurred to satisfy the demands of the cotton textile
industry, which in turn developed in response to the great global demand for cotton textiles. This demand largely
derived from the Atlantic slave trade. Not only did slave traders in West Africa ﬁnd that industrially produced British
cotton textiles successfully competed with manually produced Indian ones in the purchase of African slaves, but the
owners of American plantations also required cotton clothing for their slaves [4,5]. In other words, the very slaves who
provided inexpensive labor for harvesting raw materials for the British cotton industry were purchased and clothed
with the products of that industry. Without slavery there would have been a much smaller market for the British textile
factories. The fact that the Industrial Revolution, after all, was contingent on the toil of human bodies [6,7] gives us
reason to pause and reﬂect on our assumptions about the conditions and implications of “technological progress”.
Such were the historical origins of fossil-fuel technology. To that vast majority of people who believe that new
technologies merely hinge on the successful implementation of discoveries about the physical nature of things, the
most important lesson is that they also require money, and that this is a mystiﬁed way of saying that they constitute
proﬁtable social strategies for redistributing biophysical resources (such as embodied land, labor, materials, and energy)
in the world-system. As an anthropologist, I must conclude that the currently mainstream conception of “technology”,
in not acknowledging its dependence on asymmetric resource ﬂows, is a biased cultural category generated by historical
developments in Europe in the 18th century.
3 Energy technologies as instruments of environmental load displacement
In not recognizing its political-economic dimension, most modern people tend to project unrealistic hopes and expec-
tations onto technology and engineering science. The question is generally not if a particular problem can be solved by
engineering science, but when. We thus conﬁdently await improved versions of technologies for harnessing renewable
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energy, convinced that there can be no intrinsic obstacle to running a previously fossil-fueled modern society on photo-
voltaic energy or biofuels. From a purely physical perspective, there may not appear to be any such intrinsic obstacles.
But our energy technologies are not just physical phenomena, they are embedded in global societal exchange relations
which should be just as signiﬁcant for determining what is feasible and sustainable as purely physical calculations. An
analysis of the prospects of biofuels as a future alternative to fossil fuels must thus necessarily be interdisciplinary.
There were tangible biophysical reasons why the historical impact of fossil fuels as a source of mechanical energy was
so revolutionary. Coal, oil and natural gas are very concentrated energy sources, embodying millions of years of solar
radiation. Fossil energy made entirely new technological achievements possible —from railways to space shuttles—
which simply had not been feasible using pre-industrial energy sources. Harnessing them also meant not having to
use signiﬁcant parts of the land surface to capture solar radiation in the production of organic energy through, e.g.,
horse fodder and charcoal. What we know as “modern” society —for a long time conﬁned to the world-system cores of
Europe and North America— has for two hundred years become accustomed to an incessant succession of technological
innovations made possible by fossil fuels and the economic growth based on their combustion. Over these two centuries,
mainstream views of economic development have also been conditioned by the use of fossil fuels, as evident, e.g., in
the conventional understanding of “land” —ever since David Ricardo— as a substitutable factor of production, and
of agriculture as a marginal or even primitive pursuit.
Geopolitically, as mentioned, the British adoption of fossil-fueled steam technology was both contingent on and
instrumental in generating global shifts in the ﬂows of biophysical resources. It granted Britain “ecological relief” [8]
not only by liberating large parts of its land surface from the production of fodder, ﬁrewood and charcoal, but also
by providing access, through the sale of British exports abroad, to vast amounts of land, labor, and materials on
other continents. Through colonialism and world trade, British export production can be seen as a strategy of not
only displacing workloads to plantations and mines in the periphery, but also of environmental load displacement. By
the end of the 19th century, Britain had access to the produce of a land area several times that of its own national
territory. With the exception of mines (but not of the miners), the land (and labor) appropriated through colonialism
represented means of harvesting the organic products of contemporary sunlight. Steam technology, in other words,
was a means of commercially converting fossil energy into bioenergy and materials derived from vast land surfaces
processing solar radiation.
Against this background, the idea of mitigating the pernicious consequences of fossil fuels by replacing them with
biofuels seems na¨ıve and profoundly ﬂawed. A critique of this scheme can be conducted at two distinct analytical
levels. It can either focus on the structural contradictions of the proposal itself, which revitalize the metabolic impasse
of pre-industrial Britain, or on the various deleterious eﬀects of its implementation. At the ﬁrst level, the resort to
bioenergy as a general replacement for fossil energy can be shown to be fundamentally unfeasible, while at the second
level, the actual practice of modern bioenergy production can be shown to have highly problematic economic, political,
and ecological repercussions. Many of the latter repercussions are expressions of the structural contradictions inherent
in the very idea of post-fossil bioenergy.
4 Flaws in the vision of replacing fossil fuels with biofuels
At the level of fundamental oversights, the suggestion that we can replace the use of energy representing millions of
years of sunlight with that of current solar radiation does not recognize the crucial signiﬁcance of the vast time-spans
required to concentrate the energy in fossil fuels. To believe that the energy embodied in harvests of contemporary
organisms could substitute for the energy we now derive from the fossilized remains of the entire history of organic
life on Earth is simply misguided. This is of course not to say that energy cannot be retrieved from crops, as humans
have been doing for millennia, but that there are physical and logistic constraints which will preclude humankind from
deriving more than a small fraction of its current energy use from biofuels. A tangible such constraint is that there
simply is not enough ecologically productive space on Earth to replace a signiﬁcant share of the current use of fossil
energy with biofuels, even if we do not reckon with alternative uses of land for the production of food and materials. A
less tangible but no less serious constraint is the issue of net energy or Energy Return On Investment (EROI) [9]. To
calculate the potential of bioenergy we must subtract the energy spent on producing, harvesting, and processing it. It
is certainly physically and technically possible to produce ethanol from maize, but the question is how much energy
is expended in the process, in relation to the quantity of energy that can be derived from the ethanol produced [10].
To the extent that net energy or EROI is very low or even negative, such energy production is feasible only as long as
there is money directed to maintaining it, in eﬀect subsidizing the use of maize ethanol with other sources of energy,
predominantly the fossil energy that currently accounts for about 86% of total global energy consumption [11]. Given
the “artiﬁcial” nature of such energy production —which in terms of net energy is not energy production at all— it
is legitimate to ask whether one hectare of ethanol maize will yield more horse-power of mechanical energy than using
that hectare to produce fodder for horses.
The combustion engines through which we have harnessed fossil energy have established a conceptual lock-in or
path dependency in engineering science, founded on the assumption that a return to organic energy must nevertheless
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continue to be based on the technological advances of the age of fossil fuels. But combustion engines may be as awkward
a means of harnessing the energy of maize as horses are of harnessing that of coal. The physical relations between
inorganic versus organic energy sources and the feasible means of harnessing them has not changed since pre-industrial
times, regardless of centuries of engineering science assuming that revolutionary new forms of harnessing energy are
around the corner. To abandon fossil fuels may mean abandoning the combustion engine as the central source of
mechanical energy. It may mean having to accept that the age of fossil-fueled industrialism will have been a brief
historical discontinuity, an interlude of a few centuries between two very long periods of human social development
based primarily on organic energy. There is as yet no reason to believe that the quantitative metabolic logistics framing
the latter of these two periods will diﬀer substantially from those of the former. Textbooks in engineering science do
not dissolve the fundamental diﬀerence between organic and inorganic energy.
The ultimate rationale of contemporary visions of high-tech renewable energy production, whether biofuels or
photovoltaic electricity (both based on the idea of harnessing contemporary sunlight), may be to shield engineering
science from the traumatic implications of its historical dependency on the fossil fuels that world leaders at COP21 in
December 2015 decided to abandon. Harnessing contemporary sunlight was precisely what our 18th-century ancestors
were very eﬃcient at doing. The notion that humankind shall devise technologies for harvesting sunlight with higher
EROI than direct use of the products of photosynthesis is an example of the kinds of hubris inspired by its historically
recent turn to fossil energy. The sooner we realize this, the greater is the chance that our civilization will be able
to organize a voluntary transition to a sustainable organic energy regime, rather than succumb to unanticipated
collapse [12].
As with photovoltaics, I am not denying that energy can be accessed through biofuel technologies, merely that
these modes of harnessing energy cannot be viewed as possible replacements for fossil energy to any signiﬁcant extent.
The several problematic consequences of recent experiments with biofuel production have made this abundantly clear:
these schemes have been criticized for displacing poor people from the land they depend on, for leading to higher food
prices and concomitant increases in rates of malnutrition, for aggravating biodiversity loss, and even for generating
greenhouse gases at rates comparable to those of fossil energy production [13]. The COP21 agreement to rely on future
“negative emissions” of greenhouse gases based on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) may require
one-third of current total arable land on the planet [14]. No less than the fossil energy technologies it was meant to
replace, a large-scale production of bioenergy will be contingent on the displacement of problems to other populations,
landscapes, and generations.
5 Toward an interdisciplinary understanding of technology
The current energy impasse provides the conditions for fundamental theoretical progress in achieving an interdisci-
plinary reconceptualization of modern “technology”. When we refer to the existence of a particular kind of technology,
we tend to equate it with a corpus of know-how, a state of engineering, a set of ideas about how something can be
achieved. To be sure, this cognitive aspect of technology is a necessary condition for its existence, but it is not a
suﬃcient condition. Another prerequisite for some modern technologies, approached as physical phenomena, is an
unequal or asymmetric societal exchange of resources such as embodied labor, energy, land, or materials [15]. Like
biological organisms, technological systems are ontologically unfeasible without speciﬁc structures of material exchange
with their environments. Just as the existence of the organism is contingent on certain ﬂows of energy, water, oxygen,
and so on, the existence of a technological system is contingent on speciﬁc ﬂows of energy and materials, and at
speciﬁc rates. These latter ﬂows are organized by the economy. Technologies are thus contingent on the rates at which
energy, materials, and other inputs and outputs are exchanged in human societies. In accordance with the Second
Law of Thermodynamics, we know that the output of any technological system will represent less available energy
or productive potential than the input required for its production [16]. To be viable, in other words, a technological
system must be reproduced through biophysically asymmetric resource ﬂows.
Technological progress, in this view, is not merely a matter of politically innocent breakthroughs in engineering,
but of devising new and proﬁtable systems for displacing work and environmental pressures to other populations
and geographical areas. This may be viewed as an essential, although not necessarily conscious, rationale of globalized
technological systems. Rather than merely an index of generalized human progress —the pure, transcendent knowledge
epitomized by the myth of Prometheus— technology since the Industrial Revolution may to some extent be understood
as an arrangement for redistributing resources in global society. Many modern technologies require not just ingenuity
and specialized knowledge, but also global discrepancies in market prices. Like the money that engenders them,
globalized technologies are thus inextricably social. The phenomenon of money cannot be grasped without recognizing
its function as a mystiﬁcation of unequal exchange, and the phenomenon of modern, globalized technology cannot be
grasped without recognizing its reliance on money. To complete the syllogism, the total social phenomenon of modern
technology cannot be grasped without recognizing its reliance on unequal exchange. It is against this background that we
must ask under which market circumstances, for instance, it is feasible to fuel European cars with sugarcane ethanol
from Brazil or Africa.
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The paradigm change that current deliberations on energy policy could lead to ultimately hinges on our capacity
to dissolve the tough membrane that for centuries has insulated our thinking about Nature from our thinking about
Society. Whereas the science of economics has been justiﬁably criticized for theorizing resource management as if
there was no Nature [17,9], I would add that engineering science has theorized resource management as if there was no
global Society. Contemporary fantasies about fueling modern, high-tech society with bioenergy illustrate this illusion.
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